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ISSUE ALERT 
Related issues have been raised in the following five 
cases, all of which were heard on the April 1988 calendar: 
G140 021024 Was county which came onto plaintiff's land to 
prepare natural river for spring run-off exempt 
from liability to plaintiff under sec.63-30-3, 
management of flood waters, or was immunity from 
suit waived under 63-30-10, as destruction of 
plaintiff's property was not ordered at policy 
level. Hansen v. Salt Lake County. 
G140 021053 Was it error to declare county immune under 
sec. 63-30-3, dealing with management of 
floodwaters, as absolute immunity raises serious 
constitutional questions and contravenes public 
policy. (retroactivity should be raised by this 
court sua sponte). Irvine v. Salt Lake County. 
G140.03 870290 Is defendant school board immune under Section 
63-30-3 where surface run-off waters coming from 
the school parking regularly flood plaintiff's 
yard and house, and where the flooding is due to 
the negligent construction of the parking lot, 
and the failure of defendant to provide a 
channel for rain waters to flow in a northward 
direction into a gutter running in front of 
plaintiff's home, or is the effect of Section 
63-3-9 that immunity under Section 63-30-3 is 
waived under such circumstances? Williams v. 
Carbon County Board of Education. 
G140.03 20935 Where defendant school district negligently 
pumped flood waters into empty field so that 
waters flowed into plaintiff's property which 
was at a lower elevation than school property, 
and where school could have pumped waters 
through temporary pipes and into a storm drain, 
(1) did the removal of the waters from the 
school constitute a governmental function, 
relieving defendant of liability; (2) if so, is 
immunity waived under Section 63-30-9 or 10, and 
(3) if governmental immunity applies, does the 
application of Section 63-30-3 constitute an 
unconstitutional taking of plaintiff's property 
under Utah Constitution Article I, Section 7 
(due process)? Branam v. Provo School District 
G140.03 860289 Where Clearfield City permitted contractor to 
elevate property surrounding plaintiff's home, 
and to change the grade or slope of the 
property, and where the City also allowed the 
construction of a storm system which channels 
all water draining from contractor's subdivision 
to a point in front of and uphill from 
plaintiff's home, is defendant City liable for 
resulting damage to plaintiff's property 
occurring since 1981 (1) on a theory of 
estoppel, since the City paid for resulting 
damage through October 1984, (2) on the theory 
that Section 63-30-9, waiver, should apply 
rather than Section 63-30-3, (3) on the ground 
that the district court cannot apply Section 
63-30-3 retractively to bar plaintiff's claim, 
or (4) Is the City required to compensate 
plaintiff by condemnation under Article I, 
Section 22 Utah Constitution? Hamblin v. City 
of Clearfield 
Related issues have also been raised in the following 2 
cases, one of which, Greenwood v. Pleasant View City, has been 
tentatively scheduled for oral argument in September of 1988, and 
the other, Colman v. Land Board has been tentatively set for 
November, 1988. 
G140.03 860331 Does the doctrine of sovereign immunity, 
specifically, Section 63-30-3, nullify 
plaintiff's right to compensation under Article 
I, Section 22, Utah Constitution, where the 
State caused the Great Salt Lake Causeway to be 
breached, causing a total destruction of 
plaintiff's underwater brine canal and the 
easement therefor granted to plaintiff by the 
State? Colman v. Land Board 
G140.03 860331 Does Southern Pacific Transportation Company 
share in the State's immunity for damage caused 
by breach of the causeway across the Great Salt 
Lake, or did the State of Utah indemnify that 
company when it adopted H.B.30, the Great Salt 
Lake Causeway Act (1984 Budget Session?) Colman 
v. Land Board 
G140.03 870391 Does sec.63-30-3 (immunity for injury or damage 
resulting from activities in flood water 
management, etc.) bar personal injury plaintiff 
who fell on storm drain grill (manhole cover, 
Ingram v. SLC)? Greenwood v. Pleasant View 
City (interlocutory appeal). 
G140.03 870391 Was trial court's ruling that immunity for 
"construction, repair and operation of flood and 
storm systems" applied only to management of 
flood waters, contrary to Utah law? Greenwood 
v. Pleasant View City (interlocutory appeal). 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
On November 18, 1987, this Court granted appellant's 
Petition for Permission to Appeal an interlocutory order of the 
Second Judicial District Court denying appellant's Motion to 
Dismiss. See copy of Supreme Court's grant of interlocutory 
appeal attached hereto as Appendix I. The lower court's denial 
of the Motion to Dismiss was based upon its interpretation and 
application of the second paragraph of Section 63-30-3 of the 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Annotated. This 
Court has jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal pursuant 
to Section 78-2-2(3)(i) of the Utah Code, and Rule 5 of the 
Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL 
The issue on appeal in this case is as follows: Did the 
District Court err when it interpreted a governmental immunity 
statute contrary to its plain and obvious meaning by rewriting 
the clear language of the statute, and then giving as the exclu-
sive reason for doing so the District Court's view that the 
Legislature could not have intended the result which would 
follow if the unambiguous language of the statute were applied 
as written. 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTE 
63-30-3. Immunity of Governmental Entities from Suit. 
Except as may be otherwise provided in this 
chapter, all governmental entities are immune from 
suit for any injury which results from the exercise of 
a governmental function . . . . 
The management of flood waters and other natural 
disasters and the construction, repair, and operation 
of flood and storm systems by governmental entities 
are considered to be governmental functions, and 
governmental entities and their officers and employees 
are immune from suit for any injury or damage resulting 
from those activities. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3 (1953, as amended). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is an action in negligence for personal injury 
allegedly suffered by plaintiff-respondent when she stepped on 
a storm drain cover and fell into a storm drain owned and 
maintained by defendant-appellant Pleasant View City. 
Defendant-appellant moved to dismiss plaintiff-respondent's 
Complaint on the ground that the Complaint, on its face, is 
barred by provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, 
particularly Section 63-30-3. The District Court denied the 
motion and defendant-appellant petitioned this Court for 
permission to appeal the interlocutory order denying the motion 
to dismiss. 
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This Court granted permission to appeal and the appeal was 
taken. 
B. Facts of the Case 
1. The allegations contained in plaintiff-respondent's 
Complaint are not disputed here. Allegations which are 
material to the law of this case are as follows: 
(a) Defendant-respondent Pleasant View City is a 
political subdivision and governmental entity, as those terms 
are defined in Section 63-30-2(3) and (7) of the Utah Govern-
mental Immunity Act. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-2(3) and (7) 
(1953, as amended). See also plaintiff-respondent's Complaint 
at 1f 2, a copy of which is attached hereto as Appendix II. 
(b) Plaintiff-respondent received injury on or about 
May 4, 1985, when she "stepped on a storm drain [grill] 
maintained by Defendant . . . resulting in her falling into 
the storm drain." Plaintiff-respondent's Complaint, supra, at 
ir 3. 
(c) Defendant-appellant was responsible for 
maintenance of the storm drain and storm drain cover in 
question. Ld. at 11 4, 
(d) Other than the allegedly negligently maintained 
storm drain and storm drain cover, plaintiff-respondent alleges 
no other proximate cause for her injury. M ' at 1f1f 3-9. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Section 63-30-3 of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act 
provides absolute immunity from suit for injury or damage 
resulting from "the management of flood waters and other 
natural disasters and the construction, repair, and operation 
of flood and storm systems." Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3. The 
absoluteness of immunity is clear from the language of the 
statute: "and governmental entities . . . are immune from 
suit for any injury or damage resulting from those activities." 
Id. 
The lower court failed to apply this immunity to the 
"repair and operation" of defendant-appellant's "storm system," 
ruling that the immunity applies only where the governmental 
entity is managing flood waters. This is directly contrary to 
the language of the statute and, in effect, deletes by judicial 
fiat a significant portion of the statutory language purpose-
fully used by the Legislature. Such is contrary to Utah law. 
The lower court's ruling, based upon the lower court's view 
that a straightforward interpretation and application of the 
literal, ordinary, plain and unambiguous terms of the statute 
would bring about a result contrary to the intention of the 
Legislature, is also contrary to Utah law. The Utah Supreme 
Court has stated that where application of the ordinary meaning 
of a statute brings about a result contrary to legislative 
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intent, the remedy is to be found in the legislature, not the 
courts. 
The lower court's denial of defendant-appellant's Motion to 
Dismiss was contrary to the plain and unambiguous language of 
applicable statute and contrary to Utah law regarding statutory 
construction and application. The lower court's action must be 
reversed and judgment entered in favor of defendant-appellant. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
SECTION 63-30-3 OF THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL 
IMMUNITY ACT GRANTS ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY TO 
APPELLANT 
During the 1984 Budget Session, the Utah Legislature passed 
a "Flood Relief" bill, Senate Bill No. 97, which contained an 
amendment to Section 63-30-3 of the Utah Governmental Immunity 
Act (the "Act"). The amended section, with the amended portion 
underlined, reads as follows: 
Except as may be otherwise provided in this [act] 
chapter all governmental entities are immune from suit 
for any injury which results from the exercise of a 
governmental function, governmentally owned hospital, 
nursing home, or other governmental health care 
facility, and from an improved medical, nursing, or 
other professional health care clinical training pro-
gram conducted in either public or private facilities. 
The management of flood waters and the construc-
tion, repair and operation of flood and storm systems 
by governmental entities are considered to be govern-
mental functions, and governmental entities and their 
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officers and employees are immune from suit for any 
injury or damage resulting from those activities. 
See 1984 Utah Laws, ch. 33, § 3, copy attached hereto as 
Appendix III. 
This amendment clearly defines governmental flood control 
activities and the construction, repair and operation of a 
storm water collection system as "governmental functions." The 
Legislature, however, clarified the extent of immunity to be 
granted these activities by including the phrase: "and govern-
mental entities and their officers and employees are immune 
from suit for any injury or damage resulting from those 
activities." Id. By this clarifying language, the Legislature 
intended and accomplished a clear distinction between the 
qualified immunity found in the first paragraph of Section 
63-30-3 ("except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter") 
and the second paragraph's absolute immunity applying to flood 
control activities and storm system construction, repair and 
operation. 
If the Legislature had intended otherwise, it would have 
completed the amended second paragraph by simply defining these 
activities as "governmental functions," thereby reverting back 
to the qualifying language contained in the first paragraph of 
the Section. The Legislature, however, did not do so. By 
adding the clear language that governmental entities and their 
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officers and employees "are immune from suit for any injury or 
damage resulting from" the management of flood waters and the 
construction, repair and operation of a flood or storm system, 
the Legislature made it very clear that such activities are to 
be given absolute immunity. 
This Court has succinctly stated that the courts of this 
State must "assume[] that the terms of a statute are used 
advisedly and should be given an interpretation and application 
which is in accord with their usually accepted meanings." 
Board of Ed. of Granite Sch. Dist. v. Salt Lake County, 659 
P.2d 1030, 1035 (Utah 1983). See also Grant v. Utah State Land 
Bd., 26 Utah 2d 100, 485 P.2d 1035, 1036-37 (1971) 
("Foundational rules require that we assume that each term of 
the statute was used advisedly."). Because the Legislature 
added language to the statute ("and governmental entities . . . 
are immune from suit for any injury or damage resulting from 
those activities") that was unnecessary but for an intended 
clarification that the listed activities be given unqualified 
immunity from suit, this Court must interpret and apply that 
additional language consistent with both the Legislature's 
advised use thereof and the obvious legislative intent manifest 
therein. Doing so results in only one possible interpretation 
and application: absolute immunity attaches to the governmental 
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activities of managing flood waters and constructing, repairing 
and operating flood and storm systems.1 
1
 Numerous cases involving this same issue of law have been 
adjudicated before several District Courts of the State of 
Utah. Except for the instant case here on appeal, all have 
held that the 1984 amendment to Section 63-30-3 of the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act clarifies that a governmental entity's 
management of flood waters and its construction, repair and 
operation of flood and storm systems are absolutely immune from 
suit. Those cases include: Anderson v. City of Nephi, Civil 
No. 5982 (Fourth Judicial District Court, Utah, April 23, 1987) 
(The Hon. George E. Ballif, Judge); Hochhalter v. Sandy City 
Corp., Civil No. C85-524 (Third Judicial District Court, Utah, 
March 2, 1987) (The Hon. David S. Young, Judge); White's, Inc. 
v. Cache County, Case No. 25080 (Second Judicial District Court 
- sitting by request of First Judicial District Court, Utah, 
Nov. 6, 1986) (The Hon. Ronald 0. Hyde, Judge); Warren^Irriga-
tion Co. v. Weber County, Case No. 92165 (Second Judicial 
District Court, Utah, October 2, 1986) (The Hon. David E. Roth, 
Judge); Rydman v. Sandy City Corp., Civil No. C85-0107 (Third 
Judicial District Court, Utah, March 11, 1986) (The Hon. 
Kenneth Rigtrup, Judge); Larsen v. Brigham City, Civil No. 
18979 (First Judicial District Court, Utah, Jan. 31, 1986) (The 
Hon. Omer J. Call, Judge); Branam v. Provo Sch. Dist., Civil 
No. 66,442 (Fourth Judicial District Court, Utah, Sept. 9, 
1985) (The Hon. George E. Ballif, Judge) (currently on appeal); 
Blackburn v. Bountiful City, Civil No. 36265 (Second Judicial 
District Court, Utah, March 14, 1985) (The Hon. Douglas L. 
Cornaby, Judge); Mendenhall v. Orem City Corp., Civil No. 62597 
62597 (Fourth Judicial District Court, Utah, Oct. 9, 1984) (The 
Hon. George E. Ballif, Judge); Fairchild v. Millard County, 
Civil No. 7733 (Fourth Judicial District Court, Utah, Oct. 2, 
1984) (The Hon. J. Robert Bullock, Judge); Palmer v. Millard 
County, Civil No. 7732 (Fourth Judicial District Court, Utah, 
August 22, 1984) (The Hon. David Sam, Judge); Chelsey v. Delta 
City, Civil No. 7846 (Fourth Judicial District Court, Utah, 
July 9, 1984) (The Hon. Cullen Y. Christensen, Judge); 
Brakenseik v. Dixie Six Corp., Salt Lake County and Sandy City, 
Civil No. C-84-0564 (Third Judicial District Court, Utah, May 
18, 1984) (The Hon. Scott Daniels, Judge). Copies of Rulings, 
Orders and Judgements from these cases are attached hereto as 
Appendix IV. 
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POINT II 
THE DISTRICT COURT'S INTERPRETATION AND 
APPLICATION OF SECTION 63-30-3 WAS CONTRARY 
TO UTAH LAW 
In denying appellant's Motion to Dismiss, the District Court 
below made two critical errors: (i) it refused to distinguish 
the governmental activities of constructing, repairing and 
operating flood and storm systems from management of flood 
waters, holding instead that Section 63-30-3 of the Act only 
provides immunity to a governmental entity in "constructing, 
repairing, operating a storm system, while managing flood 
waters," see Order (emphasis added), copy attached hereto as 
Appendix V; and (ii) it refused to apply the plain and unambig-
uous terms of Section 63-30-3 to the facts of this case 
because, according to the lower court, to do so would bring 
about a result contrary to the intention of the Legislature. 
See Judge's Ruling at p.2, copy attached hereto as Appendix VI 
("[T]his isn't the typical kind of a case I think the 
Legislature had in mind when they enacted this statute."). 
Each of these errors will be addressed separately. 
A. Immunity Applies to the Construction, Repair and 
Operation of Flood and Storm Systems When Flood Waters 
are not Present 
Courts must assume that terms in a statute are used 
advisedly by the Legislature, and, accordingly, courts must 
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apply those terms in accordance with their accepted meanings. 
See Board of Ed. of Granite Sch. Dist., 659 P.2d at 1035. By 
ruling that immunity applies only when a governmental entity is 
"managing flood waters," the lower court held, in effect, that 
the terms "construction, repair, and operation of flood and 
storm systems" have no meaning or application different than or 
distinguishable from the terms "management of flood waters." 
By so holding, the lower court legislated away specific, 
express terms of the statute which, according to the law in 
Utah, were used advisedly by the Legislature. 
In clear and unambiguous language the statute divides 
immune governmental activities into two specific and distinct 
categories: (i) management of flood waters and other natural 
disasters; and (ii) construction, repair and operation of flood 
and storm systems. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3 ("and other 
natural disasters" was added by amendment in 1985, see 1985 
Utah Laws, ch. 93 § 1, copy attached hereto as Appendix VII). 
The lower court's deletion by judicial fiat of the second 
category for immunity—the construction, repair and operation 
of flood and storm systems—is blatantly contrary to Utah law. 
When a statute's meaning is plain from the words and 
language chosen by the Legislature, the court's function is to 
give effect to the law as written. In Gord v. Salt Lake City, 
20 Utah 2d 138, 434 P.2d 449 (1967), this Court declared: 
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The enactment of the statute prescribing this 
procedure is the legislative prerogative. It carries 
with it the presumptions that it is valid, and that 
the words and phrases were chosen advisedly to express 
the legislative intent. The statute should not be 
stricken down nor applied other than in accordance 
with its literal wording unless it is so unclear or 
confused as to be wholly beyond reason, or inoperable, 
or it contravenes some basic constitutional right. If 
it meets these tests it is not the court's prerogative 
to consider its wisdom, or its effectiveness, nor even 
the reasonableness or orderliness of the procedures 
set forth, but it has a duty to let it operate as the 
legislature has provided. 
434 P.2d at 451. The statutory distinction of two separate 
categories for immunity is not unclear, confused or inoperable, 
nor is it wholly beyond reason; and there is no claim that it 
is unconstitutional. The lower court, then, was duty bound to 
apply the statute and grant immunity to both categories of 
governmental activity. Id. See also West Jordan v. Morrison, 
656 P.2d 445, 446 (Utah 1982). Its refusal to grant immunity 
for the construction, repair and operation of flood and storm 
systems, then, was contrary to Utah law. 
B. The Lower Court's Justification for its Refusal to 
Apply the Plain Meaning of the Statute is Contrary to 
Utah Law 
The lower court held that a straightforward interpretation 
and application of the ordinary, plain and unambiguous terms of 
the statute in question would bring about a result contrary to 
the intention of the Legislature. See Judge's Ruling, supra. 
This Court, however, has stated that where application of the 
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"ordinary meaning" of a statute "brings about a result contrary 
to the intention of the Legislature, it is a matter for the 
Legislature to remedy. This court may not do so." West Jordan 
v. Morrison, 656 P.2d at 447. 
Respondent's Complaint, on its face, alleged that her 
injury was proximately caused by appellant's negligence in 
failing to keep in good repair part of its storm system. The 
allegation, on its face, falls four-square within the immunity 
provision of Section 63-30-3 which protects "repair" activities 
—and thus the failure to repair—on appellant's storm system. 
The lower court does not have the prerogative to consider 
whether the "Legislature had in mind" the manner in which 
plaintiff-respondent received this particular kind of injury 
"when they enacted the statute." Compare Judge's Ruling, 
supra, with West Jordan, 656 P.2d at 446. But, even if the 
lower court considered what the Legislature had in mind, it 
could only have concluded that the language of the statute was 
consistent with the intent of the Legislature. When the 
legislature added "and other natural disasters" to the second 
paragraph of Section 63-30-3 in 1985, the title of the act 
which included that amendment stated in pertinent part: 
"INCLUDING MANAGEMENT OF NATURAL DISASTERS AS AN ACTIVITY FOR 
WHICH GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES ARE IMMUNE." 1985 Utah Laws, 
Ch. 93, supra. The intent that all of the activities included 
-12-
in the second paragraph of Section 63-30-3 be immune from suit 
is clear from this language in the title of the act. See Great 
Salt Lake Authority v. Island Ranching Co., 18 Utah 2d 45, 414 
P.2d 963, 965 (1956) (where a title of an enactment can shed 
light and clarify the meaning and purpose of the enactment, 
reference to the title is appropriate). Thus, it is clear that 
the plain and unambiguous language of the immunity provision is 
consistent with legislative intent. 
In any event, the lower court must apply the terms of the 
statute as written unless such are unreasonably confused, 
inoperable, blatantly contradictory to the express purpose of 
the statute, unconstitutional, or wholly beyond reason. West 
Jordan, 656 P.2d at 446; Gord, 434 P.2d at 451. If the statute 
meets that test, as Section 63-30-3 does here, the court is 
duty bound to apply it—even if the Court believes application 
of the statute is unwise or outside the contemplation of 
legislators at the time of passage. Any other law regarding 
statutory construction would allow individual judges to 
legislate by judicial fiat, contrary to the separation of 
powers clause of the Utah Constitution. Utah Const. Art. V, 
sec. 1. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, the District Court's 
denial of appellant's Motion to Dismiss should be, and it is 
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hereby respectfully requested that the same be, reversed and 
remanded to the District Court for entry of dismissal with 
prejudice of respondent's Complaint. 
DATED this ^fi^ day of February, 1988. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Allan L. ^ arsc 
Christopher C. Fuller 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant 
SCMCCF140 
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APPENDIX I 
SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
November 18, 1987 
OFFICE OF THE CLERK 
Allan L. Larson, Esq. 
Christopher C. Fuller 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Fllor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
Carol Greenwood, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. No. 870391 
Pleasant View City, a municipal 
corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
THIS DAY, Petition for an interlocutory appeal having been 
heretofore considered, and the Court being sufficiently advised 
in the premises, it is ordered that an interlocutory appeal be, 
and the same is, granted. 
Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk 
APPENDIX I I 
STANLEY L. BALLIF (0192) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
United Savings Plaza 
4185 Harrison Boulevard 
Suite 300 
Ogden, Utah 84403 
Telephone: (801) 394-5579 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF AND FOR 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CAROL GREENWOOD. 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
PLEASANT VIEW CITY, a 
Municipal Corporation, 
Defendant. 
S U M M O N S 
i Civil No. 
THE STATE OF UTAH TO THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANT(S) 
You are hereby summoned and required to file an answer 
in writing to the attached Complaint with the Clerk of the above-
entitled Court, and to serve upon, or mail to STANLEY L. BALLIF, 
Plaintiff's attorney, at 4185 Harrison Boulevard, Suite 300, 
Ogden, Utah 84403, a copy of said answer, within 20 days after 
service of this summons upon you. 
If you fail so to do, judgment by default will be taken 
against you for the relief demanded in said Complaint, which has 
been filed with the Clerk of said Court and a copy of which is 
hereto annexed and herewith served upon you. 
DATED this day of , 1985. 
SIANLkV L. BALLIF 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
STANLEY L. BALLIF (0192) 
Attorney.for Plaintiff 
United Savings Plaza 
4185 Harrison Boulevard 
Suite 300 
Ogden, Utah 84403 
Telephone: (801) 394-5579 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF AND FOR 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CAROL GREENWOOD, ] 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PLEASANT VIEW CITY, a ! 
Municipal Corporation, 
Defendant. 
C O M P L A I N T 
Civil No. C/.>i/"> 
COMES NOW, STANLEY L. BALLIF, Attorney for Plaintiff, 
and for cause of action against Defendant, complains and alleges 
as follows: 
1. That Plaintiff is a resident of Weber County, 
State of Utah. 
2. That Defendant, Pleasant View City, is a Municipal 
Corporation-organized under the laws of the State of Utah. 
3. That on or about May 4, 1985, Plaintiff stepped on 
a storm drain maintained by Defendant next to her residence and 
the grill was not set properly, resulting in her falling into the 
storm drain. 
4. That Defendant was negligent in maintaining the 
storm drain and storm drain cover in a reasonable and safe 
condition. 
5. That Defendant was given notice of claim pursuant 
to Utah Code Annotated §63-3-11 and has denied the same. 
6. That as a proximate result of the negligence of 
Defendant, the Plaintiff suffered serious, permanent and 
debilitating injuries, all to her general damage in an amount to 
be established upon proof, 
7. That by reason of the negligence of the Defendant, 
the Plaintiff has incurred hospital and medical expenses and in 
the future will incur hospital and medical expenses, the exact 
amount of which are unknown at this time but for which which she 
shall be entitled to recover upon proof. 
8. That by reason of the negligence of the Defendant, 
the Plaintiff has lost earnings and in the future will lose 
e a r n i n g s , the exact amount of which is unknown at this time but 
for which she shall be entitled to recover upon proof. 
9. That by reason of the negligence of the Defendant, 
the Plaintiff sustained damage to her earning capacity in an 
amount to be established upon proof. 
10. Pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Annotated 
§ 7 8 - 2 7 - 4 4 , the Plaintiff is entitled to interest on all special 
damages at the rate of 8% per annum from the date of the accident 
to the date of judgment. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays judgment against the 
Defendant as follows: 
1. For general damages as may be established upon 
p r o o f . 
COMPLAINT 
GREENWOOD vs. PLEASANT VIEW 
Civi1 No. - 2 -
2. For special damages as may be established upon 
3. For interest on special damages at the rate of 8% 
per annum from the date of the accident to the date of judgment, 
4. For costs of this action and and for such other 
and further relief as the Court deems just and proper. 
DATED this day of , 1985, 
STANLEY L. BALLIF 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
COMPLAINT 
GREENWOOD vs. PLEASANT VIEW 
Civil No. -3-
APPENDIX III 
CH. 33 FLOOD RELIEF 
CHAPTER 33 
S. B. No. 97 (Passed January 28. 1984. In effect March 29. 1984.) 
(Failed to obtain 2/3 vote required for earlier effect.) 
FLOOD RELIEF - 1984 
By Senator Finlmson 
AN ACT RELATING TO FLOODING; CLARIFYING FLOODING AS A 
GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTION FOR PURPOSES OF GOVERNMENTAL 
IMMUNITY; PROVIDES AS CRITERIA FOR THE DRB FUNDING 
MULTI-COUNTY FLOOD DAMAGE; GIVING EMERGENCY FLOOD 
POWERS TO THE STATE ENGINEER; CREATING A TASK FORCE TO 
LOOK AT INTER-COUNTY FLOODING; STATING THAT IT IS IN 
THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE STATE AND ITS POLITICAL SUB-
DIVISIONS TO MANAGE THE STATE'S BODIES OF WATER; APPRO-
PRIATING FUNDS FOR FLOODING; AND PROVIDING AN EFFEC-
TIVE DATE. 
THIS ACT AMENDS SECTION 63-30-3, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
1953, AS ENACTED BY CHAPTER 116, LAWS OF UTAH 1981, AND 
SECTION 63-52a-10, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953. AS ENACTED 
BY CHAPTER 15, LAWS OF UTAH 1983, FIRST SPECIAL SESSION; 
ENACTS SECTIONS 63-52a-1.5 AND 73-2-22. UTAH CODE ANNO-
TATED 1953. AND ENACTS NEW MATERIAL. 
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Utah: 
Section 1. Section amended. 
Section 63-30-3. Utah Code Annotated 1953, as last amended by 
Chapter 116. Laws of Utah 1981, is amended to read: 
63-30-3 . Immunity of governmental entities from suit 
Except as may be otherwise provided in this [aet] chapter, all gov-
ernmental entities are immune from suit for any injury which results from 
the exercise of a governmental function, govemmentally-owned hospital, 
nursing home, or other governmental health care facility, and from an 
approved medical, nursing, or other professional health care clinical train-
ing program conducted in either public or private facilities. 
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The management of flood waters and the construction, repair, and 
operation of flood and storm systems by governmental entities are consid-
ered to be governmental functions, and governmental entities and their 
officers and employees are immune from suit for any injury or damage 
resulting from those activities. 
Section 2. Section amended. 
Section 63-52a-10, Utah Code Annotated 1953. as enacted by Chapter 
15, Laws of Utah 1983, First Special Session, is amended to read: 
63 -52a -10. Conditions for granting disaster relief funds--Standards 
for repair, construction, and land use--Potential for multiple county 
flood damage. 
(1) As a condition of any disaster relief funds granted under this 
chapter, the receiving political subdivision shall agree that any repair or 
construction to be financed therewith shall be in accordance with applicable 
standards of safety, decency, and sanitation and in conformity with ap-
plicable codes, specifications, and standards, and shall furnish such evidence 
' of compliance with this section as may be required by the DRB. As a 
further condition of receiving a disaster relief grant under this chapter, the 
receiving political subdivision shall agree that the natural hazards in the 
areas in which the proceeds of the grants are to be used will be evaluated 
and appropriate action taken to mitigate those hazards, including safe land 
use and construction practices, in accordance with standards prescribed or 
approved by the DRB after adequate consultation with the governing body 
of the political subdivision to which the grant is to be made. 
(2) Whenever the DRB considers a request for disaster relief funds for 
a political subdivision and there is a potential for multiple county flood 
damage, the political subdivision must provide the DRB with information 
on the effect any project has on downstream counties. That information 
shall be considered as part of the DRB's criteria for approving the funding. 
Section 3. Section enacted. 
Section 73-2-22, Utah Code Annotated 1953, is enacted to read: 
73-2-22. Emergency flood powers--Action to enforce orders--Access 
rights to private and public property--Injunctive relief against state 
engineer's decisions--Judicial review provisions not applicable. 
Whenever the state engineer, with approval of the chairman of the 
Disaster Emergency Advisory Council, makes a written finding that any 
reservoir or stream has reached or will reach during the current water year 
a level far enough above average and in excess of capacity that public safety 
is or is likely to be endangered or that substantial property damage is 
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APPENDIX IV 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTA^ i 
Civil No. 5982 
RULING 
ANDY ANDERSON and BEVERLY 
ANDERSON, as individuals and 
conservators of the estate 
Of CODY ANDERSON, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
THE CITY OF NEPHI and LYNN'S 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, 
Defendants. 
This matter is before the court on defendant Nephi 
City's (Nephi) Motion for Summary Judgment in its favor and 
against plaintiffs Andy Anderson and Beverly Anderson, and 
against co-defendant Lynn's Construction Company on Nephi's 
cross-claim. The court having carefully considered the motion 
and accompanying memoranda now enters its 
RULING 
Nephi bases its motion to dismiss on the immunity 
granted it by Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended) (U.C.A.) 63-
30-3 which states in pertinent part 
The management of flood waters and other 
natural disasters and the construction, 
repair, and operation of flood and storm 
systems by governmental entities are 
considered to be governmental functions, and 
governmental entities and their officers and 
employees are immune from suit for any injury 
or damage resulting from those activities. 
Nephi's status as a governmental entity is not 
disputed. This court has previously ruled on U.C.A. 63-30-3 and 
held that it 
provides absolute immunity to governmental 
entities from suit for any injury or damage 
resulting from management of flood waters and 
the construction, repair, and operation of 
flood and storm systems by governmental 
entities; the Court concludes that the 1984 
amendment to Utah Code Ann. 63-30-3 is 
applicable to causes of action arising even 
before the amendment . . . 
Russell Mendenhall, et al. v. University Mall, Inc., et al., Utah 
County, Civil No. 62,597 (October 24, 1984) and Evah Conk 
Fairchild v. State of Utah, et al., Millard County, Civil No. 
7733 (September 27, 1984). 
Nephi City contracted with Lynn's Construction Company 
to repair and improve the city's flood channels following damage 
to their flood and storm system in 1983. The evidence before 
this Court supports the conclusion that the primary purpose of 
the work so contracted was to repair and construct Nephi1s flood 
and storm system. A major part of this repair and improvement 
project was the construction of cement headwalls around the 
culverts that ran under roads. Incidental to this work was the 
widening and resurfacing of abutting roads. This court finds 
that where the major purpose and part of a municipal construction 
project is to construct or repair a flood and storm system, the 
activity falls within U.C.A. 63-30-3's protection to governmental 
entities for the "management of flood waters . . . and the 
construction, repair, and operation of flood and storm systems 
[. ],f This finding is given additional weight in the instant case 
where the facts indicate that the young Cody Anderson fell from 
one of the headwalls under construction and was injured. 
Based on the foregoing analysis, defendant Nephi City's 
Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. Counsel for Nephi City 
is directed to prepare an appropriate order and submit it to the 
court. 
DATED, at Provo, Utah, this £ J day of April, 1987. 
JODY K BURNETT 
CHRISTOPHER C. FULLER 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
RUDY HOCHHALTER, RICHARD and 
JUNE THOMPSON, ALTA McCLEERY, 
ERWIN SCHELIN, GERALD and MERI SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND ORDER 
OSHEL, KAREN and BLAINE CRAVENS, 
and RUDOLPH and SUKI SIEPEL, 
Plaintiffs, Civil No. C85-5241 
vs. Judge David S. Young 
SANDY CITY CORPORATION, a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendants. 
The above-named defendant Sandy City Corporation's Motion 
for Summary Judgment came on for oral argument before the above-
referenced Court, the Honorable David S. Young presiding, on 
Tuesday, February 17, 1987, with plaintiffs represented by 
William L. Schultz and defendant represented by Christopher C. 
Fuller of Snow, Christensen & Martineau. 
The Court, having reviewed the pleadings, affidavit and 
memoranda on file, having heard oral argument, and being fully 
advised in the premises, concludes that the Utah Governmental 
-1-
Immunity Act's Section 63-30-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as 
amended, provides absolute immunity to governmental entities 
from suit for any injury or damage resulting from the repair 
and operation of a flood and storm system, that plaintiffs' 
allegations against defendant Sandy City fall within the abso-
lute immunity provisions of Section 63-30-3, that there are no 
material facts in dispute sufficient to overcome application of 
the statutory grant of absolute immunity in this case, and that, 
accordingly, defendant Sandy City is immune from suit for the 
injury or damage complained of by plaintiffs here, and defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment is well taken, and as a matter of law, 
should be granted. 
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that plain-
tiffs' Complaint be, and hereby is, dismissed with prejudice and 
on the merits, and that final judgment be, and hereby is, entered 
in favor of defendant and against plaintiffs, No Cause of Action, 
each party to bear its own costs. 
DATED this .^ day of February, 1987. 
BY THE COURT: 
fel y&h >•*) £ x/n<n.t: 
David S. Young 
Third District Judge 
9-
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GARY 0. McKEAN 
DEPUTY CACHE COUNTY ATTORNEY 
160 North Main Street, Suite 204 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone: (801) 752-8920 
CHRISTOPHER C. FULLER 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR WEBER COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
WHITE'S INC., d/b/a WHITE'S 
TROUT FARM, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CACHE COUNTY, a Municipal 
Corporation, 
Defendant. 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss came on for oral argument 
before this Court, sitting by special designation for and on 
behalf of the First Judicial District Court in and for Cache 
County, on Friday, October 31, 1986, with Gary 0. McKean, Deputy 
Cache County Attorney and Christopher C. Fuller of Snow, Christ-
ensen & Martineau representing defendant and George W, Preston 
of Harris, Preston, Gutke & Chambers representing plaintiff. 
Having heard oral arguments by both parties, having reviewed the 
memoranda filed by each side, having issued a Ruling on Defend-
ant's Motion for Summary Judgment [sic] dated November 6, 1986, 
JUDGMENT AND ORDER 
Cache County Civil No. 25 
-1-
and being fully advised in the premises, the Court concludes 
that: 
(a) Plaintiff's Complaint alleges that defendant Cache 
County was negligent in installing beneath a county road, a cul-
vert that was inadequate and could not accommodate drainage water 
in a period of heavy water run-off, that defendant was negligent 
in not correcting the inadequacy, and that, after a substantial 
rainfall in February of 1986, defendant failed to timely cut the 
road where the culvert was located in order to expedite drainage 
of accumulating water even though plaintiff had requested that it 
do so, all of which caused damage to plaintiff's property; 
(b) Said allegations fall under the provisions of Section 
63-30-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, which provisions 
give absolute immunity to governmental entities for flood control 
activities and for storm system construction, repair and operation, 
regardless of any other provisions in the chapter; 
(c) The provisions are clear and unambiguous, and grant abso-
lute immunity to defendant. 
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that plain-
tiff's Complaint be, and hereby is, dismissed with prejudice and 
on the merits, each party to bear its own costs. 
DATED this ^J3 day of November, 1986. 
BY THE COURT: 
r\L,A • l-
Ronald 0. Hyde, District Judge 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WHITE'S INC., dba ] 
WHITE'S TROUT FARM, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. ! 
CACHE COUNTY, a Municipal 
corporation, 
Defendant. 
i RULING ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
1 FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
i Case No. 25080 
Plaintiff had filed action against the defendant for 
damage to their property caused by high water. Plaintiff alleges 
that the defendant replaced a bridge with culverts which would 
not accommodate drainage water in a period of heavy water runoff. 
Plaintiffs claim they were negligent in installing the culvert 
and in failing to correct or otherwise remedy the restriction. 
Plaintiff claims that in February, 1986, Cache County sustained 
substantial rainfall and the culvert in question was inadequate 
to hand!? the water drairage in the area. Further, the plaintiff 
requested that they be allowed to cut the road or the 
Commissioners cut the road in order to avoid damage from the 
flood waters. Plaintiff claims that immunity has been waived by 
reason of Section 63-30-8, 9, and 10. Defendant claims they are 
immune under Section 63-30-3. 
Page 2 
Ruling on Defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment 
Case No. 25080 
During the 1984 Budget Session, the Utah Legislature 
passed a "flood relief bill carrying an amendment to Section 
63-30-3, of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. The amendment 
states that the management of flood waters and the construction/ 
repairr and the operation of flood and storm systems by govern-
mental entities are considered to be governmental functions, and 
governmental entities and their officers and employees are immune 
from suit for any injury or damage resulting from those 
activities. 
This paragraph gives absolute immunity to the govern-
mental entity in regard to flood control activities and storm 
system construction, repair, and operation, regardless of any 
other provisions in the chapter. 
Plaintiffs allegation is that they received injury as a 
result of the inadequacy of the culvert to carry away flood 
waters. It is their claim that this is negligence, and by 
claiming negligence, this removes it from 63-30-3. Further, they 
claim that the grvernmental entities should have managed the 
flood waters by cutting road, thereby increasing the capacity of 
the culvert in question, and that their failure to do so is 
actionable. Section 63-30-3 grants immunity for the management 
of flood waters. 
Page 3 
Ruling on Defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment 
Case No. 25080 
I hold that the acts complained of in this action fall 
under the provisions for the construction, repair and operation 
of storm systems and for the management of flood waters. The 
immunity provisions of Section 63-30-3 are clear and grant 
absolute immunity to the defendant. 
Defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint is 
granted. 
DATED this O day of November, 1986. 
RONALD 0. HYDE, Judgi 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this (/^  day of November, 1986, 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing Ruling on Defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment was served upon the following: 
George W. Preston 
HARRIS, PRESTON, GUTKE h CHAMBERS 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
31 Federal Avenue 
Logan, Utah 84321 
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Motion for Summary Judgment 
Case No. 25080 
Gary 0. McKean 
Deputy Cache County Attorney 
160 North Main Street, Suite 204 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Christopher C. Fuller 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorney for Defendant 
10 Exchange Place, 11th floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
t^s** 
ULA CARR, Secretary 
ALLAN L. LARSON 
CHRISTOPHER C. FULLER 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
WARREN IRRIGATION COMPANY, a 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND ORDER 
vs. 
WEBER COUNTY, a political 
subdivision of the State of Civil No. 92165 
Utah, 
Defendant. 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and plaintiff's 
Motion to Amend Complaint came on for oral argument before this 
Court on Monday, September 15, 1986, at 11:00 o'clock a.m., 
defendant being represented by Christopher C. Fuller of Snow, 
Christensen & Martineau, and plaintiff being represented by 
Michael J, Glassman and E. J. Skeen of Van Cott, Bagley, 
Cornwall & McCarthy. Having reviewed the memoranda and 
affidavits filed by both parties on both motions, having heard 
oral argument from both parties, having issued a Ruling on 
Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to Amend dated 
October 24, 1986, and being fully advised in the premises, the 
Court concludes as follows: 
(a) With respect to plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint, 
the third cause of action in plaintiff's proposed Second 
Amended Complaint raises matters which occurred in the spring 
of 1984, approximately one year after the events and acts 
complained of in plaintiff's previous Complaints and in the 
Notice of Claim it filed with defendant Weber County, and 
involves actions and allegations that are substantially 
different from those raised in these earlier documents. 
Because the notice of claim provision of Section 63-30-13, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, of the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act, serves as a condition precedent to the filing of 
a lawsuit against a governmental entity, and because the third 
cause of action in plaintiff's proposed Second Amended 
Complaint raises issues and alleges actions, events and 
injuries substantially different both in content and in time of 
occurrence from those raised and alleged in its previous 
Complaints and as set forth in its Notice of Claim, plaintiff 
should have filed a timely Notice of Claim with defendant 
complaining of the 1984 injuries. Plaintiff's failure to so 
-2-
file a timely Notice of Claim bars the third cause of action in 
its proposed Second Amended Complaint; and, there being no 
substantive difference between plaintiff's first and second 
causes of action in its proposed Second Amended Complaint and 
those causes of action in plaintiff's Amended Complaint, 
plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint should be denied; 
(b) With respect to defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, Section 63-30-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as 
amended, clearly provides absolute immunity to defendant Weber 
County for any injury or damage resulting from the management 
of flood waters. Here, in an attempt to manage the widespread 
flooding in Weber County during May of 1983 and after declaring 
a local disaster emergency, defendant, by and through its 
authorized officers, breached plaintiff's canal. Pursuant to 
the Governmental Immunity Act provisions cited above, defendant 
is immune from plaintiff's first cause of action for damages 
allegedly resulting from the breach of plaintiff's canal. 
Furthermore, plaintiff's second cause of action for inverse 
condemnation is not recognized as a valid claim by Utah courts, 
as evidenced by the holdings in Andrus v. State, 541 P.2d 1117 
(Utah 1975), and Fairclough v. Salt Lake County, 10 Utah 2d 
417, 354 P.2d 105 (1960). 
(c) Accordingly, summary judgment in favor of defendant 
should be granted as to plaintiff's first and second causes of 
-3-
action, and, because plaintiff's proposed third cause of action 
is barred as set forth above, plaintiff's Amended Complaint 
should be dismissed with prejudice as a matter of law, there 
being no dispute as to any material fact. 
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that: 
(a) plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint be, and the same 
hereby is, denied; (b) there being no dispute as to any 
material fact, as a matter of law, defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment be, and hereby is, granted; and 
(c) accordingly, plaintiff's Amended Complaint be, and hereby 
is, dismissed with prejudice and on the merits, each party to 
bear its own costs. 
DATED this /^ day of __ fUf , 1986. 
BY THE COURT: 
By D70/1P E. ROTH 
David E. Roth, Second Judicial 
District Judge 
SCMCCF10 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH 
WARREN IRRIGATION COMPANY, ] 
a corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WEBER COUNTY, a political 
subdivision of the ] 
State of Utah, ) 
Defendant. 
1 RULING ON MOTION FOR 
I SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 
i MOTION TO AMEND 
1 Case No. 92165 
Having heard arguments of counsel and considering the 
memoranda on filef I rule as follows: 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
In May of 1983, Weber County was experiencing widespread 
flooding. The Weber County Commissioners declared that a local 
disaster emergency existed. The Countyf in attempting to manage 
the flood, breached plaintiff's canal. Plaintiffs specifically 
denied permission to breach their canal. Plaintiffs claim damage 
in their first cause of action alleging that, there was no 
emergency caused by flood waters and that no flooding could have 
been prevented by breaching the canal. Plaintiff1s second cause 
of action alleges inverse condemnation suggesting that the 
County, in May, 1983, took possession of plaintiff1s property. 
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Ruling on Motion for Summary 
Judgment and Motion to Amend 
Case No. 92165 
destroyed a segment of plaintiff's canal, and then required that 
plaintiff replace the segment (with three large culverts of 
greater capacity) at a cost of $38f900. 
I find that Section 63-30-3 and 63-30-10(1)(a), U.C.A., 
clearly provide absolute immunity to Weber County for any injury 
or damage resulting from the management of flood waters. Defen-
dant's motion for summary judgment is therefore granted as to 
plaintiff's first cause of action. 
Plaintiff's second cause of action alleges inverse 
condemnation. Causes of action for inverse condemnation have not 
been recognized by Utah Courts. Andrus v. State, 541 P.2d 1117 
(1975); Fairclough v. Salt Lake County, 10 Utah 2d 417, 354 P.2d 
105 (1960). Accordingly, defendant's motion for summary judgment 
is granted as to plaintiff's second cause of action. 
MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT 
Plaintiff moves to file a Second Amended Complaint to 
allege a third cause of action claiming damage resulting from 
actions of the defendant in the spring of 1984. Plaintiff's 
Notice of Claim, plaintiff's original Complaint, and plaintiff's 
Amended Complaint allege damage resulting from defendant's 
activities in May of 1983. The second Amended Complaint claims 
damage in the amount of $33,100, due to defendant's requirement 
the plaintiff insert three large culverts underneath the canal in 
question. Plaintiff claims that this requirement amounts to a 
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Judgment and Motion to Amend 
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taking on the part of of the County. Defendant argues, among 
other things, that plaintiff's claim is barred because plain-
tiff's Second Amended Complaint makes a claim that is totally 
separate and distinct from the claims made in earlier documents 
and that plaintiff failed to file a Notice of Claim with respect 
to the spring of 1984f cause of action. 
Section 63-30-13, U.C.A., 1953 as amended, requires that 
a claim against a political subdivision be filed within one year 
after the claim arises. The purpose of this requirement is to 
"prevent needless litigation" and to give "authorities prompt 
notice of an injury and the surrounding circumstances in order 
that the matter may be investigated while the matter is fresh, 
the witnesses available, and before conditions have changed 
materially, and that the liability of the municipality or the 
extent of the liability may be determined." 56 AmJur2d Sec. 
686. The notice requirement is not in the nature of a Statute of 
Limitations and is considered a necessary condition precedent to 
the filing of a lawsuit. 56 AmJur2d Sec. 683, Barney v. Clark 
County, 389 P.2d 392 (Nevada, 1964). The fact that County 
officials may have had actual knowledge of the circumstances 
which results in a claim does not dispense with the necessity of 
filing a timely claim. Varoz v. Sevev, 506 P.2d 435, 29 Utah 2d 
158 (1973) . 
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Judgment and Motion to Amend 
Case No. 92165 
I find that plaintiff1s third cause of action in the 
proposed Second Amended Complaint raises issues that arose 
approximately one year after the events and acts complained of in 
the previous Complaints and Notice of Claim. It involves actions 
and allegations that are substantially different from those 
raised in previous documents. Plaintiff should have filed a 
timely Notice of Claim complaining of defendant's actions taken 
in the spring of 1984. Plaintiff's failure to do so requires 
that I deny their motion to amend. 
Defendant to prepare a formal ruling in this case. 
DATED this JL^day of October, 1986. 
ALLAN L. LARSON (A1896) 
CHRISTOPHER C. FULLER (A4319) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendants 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 3000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROY G. RYDMAN and KATHY M. 
RYDMAN, 
Plaintiffs, SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
VS. 
Civil No. C85-0107 
SANDY CITY CORPORATION, 
LAWRENCE P. SMITH and Judge Kenneth Rigtrup 
RANDY TAYLOR, 
Defendants. 
The above-named defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment 
came on for oral argument before the above-referenced Court, 
the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup presiding, on Monday, January 20, 
1986, with plaintiffs represented by J. David Nelson of Bailey, 
Nelson & Conklin, and defendants represented by Christopher C. 
Fuller of Snow, Christensen & Martineau. 
The Court, having reviewed the pleadings, affidavit and 
memoranda on file, having heard oral argument, and being fully 
advised in the premises, concludes that (a) defendants' activi-
ties complained of by plaintiffs are immune from suit by virtue 
1-
of Section 63-30-3 of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act (the 
"Act"), which grants absolute immunity for damages resulting 
from the construction/ repair and operation of flood and storm 
systems; (b) that any representations made to plaintiffs with 
respect to such activities by defendants Smith or Taylor in their 
representative capacities as Mayor and Public Works Director of 
Sandy City, respectively, are immune from suit by virtue of 
Section 63-30-10 (1)(f) of the Act, which excepts a waiver of 
immunity for damages resulting from misrepresentations of govern-
mental entity employees; and (c) that, based upon the foregoing, 
defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is well-taken and, as a 
matter of law, should be granted. 
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that plain-
tiffs' Complaint be, and hereby is, dismissed with prejudice 
and on the merits, that final judgment be, and hereby is, entered 
in favor of defendants and against plaintiffs, no cause of action, 
each party to bear its own costs. 
DATED this 11 ~^day of . 1986. 
COURT: 
*32^__ 
District Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM ONLY: 
BAILEY, NELSON & CONKLIN 
BY-J. Davxd Nelson 
Attorneys for Plaint i f fs 
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ALLAN L. LARSON 
CHRISTOPHER C. FULLER 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant Brigham City 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 3000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR BOX ELDER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CURTIS D. LARSEN, 
Plaintiff, SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
vs. 
Civil No. 18979 
BRIGHAM CITH, 
Defendant. 
Defendant Brigham City's Motion for Summary Judgment came 
on for oral argument before the above-/£eferenced Court on October 
25, 1985. Following oral argument, the Court granted a 30-day 
time period in which plaintiff could file additional memoranda 
or counter-affidavits in opposition to defendant's Motion. 
Plaintiff filed additional affidavits and defendant filed objec-
tions thereto and a Supplemental Memorandum. 
Having considered the arguments presented during oral argu-
ment, having reviewed the pleadings, affidavits and memoranda on 
file, and being fully advised in the premises, the Court con-
cludes that there is no dispute that during the period preceding^
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the filing of plaintiff's Complaint: (a) there was unusally high 
precipitation in the Mantua Reservoir area where plaintiff's 
land is located; (b) that defendant constructed earthen dams and 
drainage ditches surrounding its reservoir; (c) that such measures 
were part of defendant's efforts to control a water-flooding situ-
ation in the area; (d) that such measures resulted in water invad-
ing plaintiff's property; and (e) that the reservoir and drainage 
ditches were constructed and had been in existence and use for 
more than 20 years without complaints similar to plaintiff's. 
The Court also concludes that the water which found its way onto 
plaintiff's lands during 1984 resulted from defendant's flood 
control measures necessitated by the abnormally heavy precipita-
tion, and for which activities defendant is immune from suit by 
virtue of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, particularly Section 
63-30-3, as amended, and therefore defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment should be'granted as a matter ,of law. 
/ 
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that defend-
ant Brigham City Corporation's Motion for Summary Judgment be, 
and hereby is, granted, and that plaintiff's Complaint be, and 
hereby is, dismissed with prejudice and upon the merits. Judg-
ment is hereby entered in favor of defendant and against plaintiff, 
No Cause of Action, each party to bear its own costs. 
DATED this jj/ day of January, 1986. 
ALLAN L. LARSON 
CHRISTOPHER C. FULLER 
SNOW# CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 3000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
DIANE BRANAMf 
Plaintiff, SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
v s . 
C i v i l No. 66,442 
PROVO SCHOOL DISTRICT, a 
body p o l i t i c , George E. B a l l i f , Judge 
Defendant. 
Defendant Provo School District's Motion for Summary Judg-
ment came on for oral argument before the above-referenced Court 
pursuant to Rule 2.8 of the Rules of Practice of the District 
Courts of the State of Utah, on August 16, 1985. Plaintiff was 
represented by Michael D. Esplin, of Aldrich, Nelson, Weight & 
Esplin, and defendant was represented by Christopher C. Fuller 
of the law firm of Snow, Chris tens en & Martineau. 
The Court having made a Ruling on June 19, 1985 granting 
defendant Provo School District's Motion for Summary Judgment, 
having reviewed and considered the Memoranda and Affidavits on 
file, having heard the argument of counsel, and having issued 
another Ruling on August 29, 1985, which confirmed the June 19, 
1985 Ruling of this Court, and being fully advised in the premises, 
1-
The Court concludes that the 1984 Amendment to Section 
63-30-3 of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act (the "Act"), 
provides absolute immunity to governmental entities from suit 
for any injury or damage resulting from the management of flood 
waters and the construction, repair, and operation of flood and 
storm systems, that said amendment is applicable to causes of 
action arising even before the enactment of the amendment, and 
that, as a result of these amended provisions of said section 
of the Act, defendant Provo School District, as a political 
subdivision and governmental entity of the State of Utah, is 
immune from suit herein, and, as a matter of lav, defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted, No Cause of 
Action. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 
plaintiff's Complaint against defendant Provo School District 
be, and the same hereby is, dismissed with prejudice and upon 
the merits, and judgment is hereby entered in favor of the 
defendant and against the plaintiff, No Cause of Action. 
DATED this y day of September, 1985. 
BY THE COURT: 
. gallif, Judge / George E, 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
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In the District Court of the Second Judicial District 
IN AND FOR THX 
County of Davis, State of UtaK 
KIMBALL BLACKBURN, et al.# 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BOUNTIFUL CITY, et al., 
Defendant. 
The motions of all defendants came before the court for 
hearing on March 5, 1985, with David 0. Seeley appearing for 
the plaintiffs, Lynn Davies appearing for the defendant, Bounti-
ful City, Brad Holm appearing for the defendant, South Davis 
County Sewer Improvement District, and Robert H. Henderson ap-
pearing for the defendants, Davis County and West Bountiful 
City. Mr. Henderson argued his motion to dismiss the third 
party complaint. Mr. Holm and Mr. Davies argued their respec-
tive motions for summary judgment. After oral argument by all 
parties the court took the matter under advisement. The court 
now rules on the motions. 
The plaintiffs were damaged in the spring of 1983 when raw 
sewage backed up into their homes. The damage occurred because 
of the spring floods. The 1984 amendment to section 60-30-3 
provided that the management of flood waters was to be considered 
a governmental function and that governmental entities were im-
mune from suit. 
This court believes the legislature intended to grant ab-
solute immunity to governmental entities under the 1984 amend-
ment. The plaintiffs1 damage clearly resulted from the spring 
floods. Except for the flood waters in the sewer line there 
would not have been a backup of sewer into the plaintiffs1 homes. 
The provision in the first paragraph of section 63-30-3 providing 
that "except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter" should 
RULING ON MOTIONS 
Civil No. 36265 
not be interpreted to put limitations on the second paragraph 
having to do with flood damage. This court, however, recognizes 
that there is a perfectly good argument to the contrary. 
This court also believes that the 1984 amendment to section 
63*30*3 should be applied retroactively. The considerations are 
the same in this case as in the case of Frank vs. State, 613P.2d 
517 (Utah 1980) 
Accordingly, it is ordered that the motion to dismiss by 
Davis County and by West Bountiful City are granted and the 
third party complaint is dismissed, and the motions by Bountiful 
City and South Davis County Sewer District for summary judgment 
are granted. 
Counsel for the South Davis County Sewer District is ordered 
to draw a formal ruling in this case. 
Dated March 14, 1985. 
BY THE COURT: 
^ • 
" JUDGBs. / 
Certificate of Mailing: ^-^ 
This is to certify that the undersigned mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Ruling to David 0. Seeley, American 
Plaza II, Third Floor, 57 West 200 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84101; Lynn Davies, CSB Tower, Suite 700, 50 South Main Street, 
P. 0. Box 2465, Salt Lake City, Utah 84110; Brad Holm, 261 East 
300 South, Second Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111; and Robert 
H. Henderson, 10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor, Post Office Box 
3000, Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 on March 15, 1985. 
Deputy C 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
RUSSELL MENDENHALL, et al, Civil No. 62597 
Plaintiffs, 
VS. R U L I N G 
DREM CITY CORPORATION, 
at al# 
Defendants. 
The motion of the defendant, Orem City, for Summary Judgment dis-
nissing them from this proceeding came before the Court pursuant to 
Rule 2.8. The parties have submitted their supporting memorandum and 
the Court having fully considered same, now enters the following: 
RULING 
The Court is inclined to grant the Motion of Orem City based upon 
che passage by the 19C4 Budget Session of the Utah State Legislature of 
bhe following amendment to Chapter 63-30-3 of the Governmental Immunity 
Vet, the amending portion provides as follows: 
"The management of flood waters and the construction, 
repair, and operation of flood and storm systems by govern-
mental entities are considered to be governmental functions 
and governmental entities and their officers and employees 
are immune from suit for any injury or damage resulting 
from those activities." 
The retro-active application of this provision to the facts of 
:he case before the Court come with the language of State v. Frank/ 
>13 P. 2d 517, having interpreted the amendment in an analogous case 
:o be clarifying flooding as a governmental function for purposes of 
jovernmental immunity. It appears that other courts of similar juris-
Jiction to this and one department of this court has so ruled as to the 
amendment. 
The Court will not authorize the entry of an Order based upon 
this Ruling to afford the plaintiffs an opportunity for further hear-
ing/ oral argument or inquiry into any other pertinent matter plain-
tiffs deem appropriate and will allow a period of ten days for counsel 
to request any further proceedings before such Ruling is implemented 
by an Order. ^ 
Dated at Provo, Utah County, Utah/ this II day of September, 
1 9 8 4 . 
pv£ 
GEORGEC£. BALLTF, JUtfGE 
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ise* CCT 30 iy. 9 5? 
ROBERT H. HENDERSON 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant Orem City 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
P. 0. Box 3000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RUSSELL MENDENHALL; SARAH 
JAN BURY; BRENT STARK; 
ROBERT CONOVER and VALERIE 
CONOVER, his wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
UNIVERSITY MALL, INC., a 
corporation; OREM CITY 
CORPORATION, a municipal 
corporation; MERRILL 
GAPPMAYER, 
Defendants. 
Defendant Orem City's Motion for Summary Judgment came 
on for oral argument on October 26, 1984. Plaintiffs were 
represented by Thomas S. Taylor of the law firm Christensen, 
Taylor & Moody. Defendant Orem City was represented by 
Robert H. Henderson of the law firm Snow, Christensen & Martineai 
The Court having heard the argument of counsel, and 
having reviewed and considered the memoranda on file, and 
being fully advised in the premises: 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 62,597 
The Court concludes that Utah Code Annotated § 63-30-3 
as amended in 1984 provides absolute immunity to governmental 
entities from suit for any injury or damage resulting from 
management of flood waters and the construction, repair, 
and operation of flood and storm systems by governmental 
entities; the Court concludes that the 1984 amendment to 
the Utah Code Annotated S 63-30-3 is applicable to causes of 
action arising even before the amendment; the Court concludes 
that the acts Orem City has been sued upon were governmental 
functions for which immunity has not been waived and that, 
therefore, the governmental entity, Orem City, is immune from 
suit herein pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Annotated 
S 63-30-3. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that: 
Judgment be, and hereby is entered against plaintiffs and in 
favor of the defendant Orem City dismissing with prejudice 
plaintiffs1 Complaint against defendant Orem City. 
DATED this ^^ day of October, 1984. 
BY THE COURT: 
milf / 
District Court Judge 
Geofge E. 
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ROEIRT H. HENDERSON 
SNOW, CKR1STENSEN & MARTI NE.VJ 
Attorneys for the Irrigation Companies 
and Their Presidents and Killard County 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
P. 0. Bex 3000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Telephone: (601) 521-90C0 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT COURT 
OCT - 3 1984 
% 
MILLARD COUNTY 
„ Clei 
OF MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
EVAH CONK FAIRCHILD, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
STATE OF UTAH; DEE C. HANSEN 
as UTAH STATE ENGINEER; DELTA 
CANAL COMPANY; PHIL SMITH, 
President of Delta Canal 
Company; MELVILLE IRRIGATION 
COMPANY; QUINN SHEPHARD, 
President of Melville 
Irrigation Company; ABRAHAM 
IRRIGATION COMPANY; RICHARD 
HENRIE, President of Abraham 
Irrigation Company; DESERET 
IRRIGATION COMPANY; ROGER 
STANWORTH, President of 
Deseret Irrigation Company; 
ROGER WALKER, as Lower Sevier 
River Commissioner; MILLARD 
COUNTY; DELTA CANAL COMPANY, 
MELVILLE IRRIGATION COMPANY, 
ABRAHAM IRRIGATION COMPANY, 
and DESERET IRRIGATION COMPANY 
dba DMAD COMPANY; DESERET 
IRRIGATION COMPANY and 
ABRAHAM IRRIGATION COMPANY 
dba GUNNISON BEND DAM; and 
JOHN DOE CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, 
Defendants. 
ORDER, JUDGMENT AND 
ORDER EXPRESSLY 
DIRECTING ENTRY OF 
JUDGMENT PURSUANT 
TO RULE 54(b) 
Civil No.: 7733 
On September 21, 1984, the following Motions came on 
regularly for hearing before the Honorable J. Robert Bullock; 
1. Plair.tiif's Motion to Arena Corplamt; and 
2. Tne Motions tc Dismiss of the defendants. 
The plaintiff \:as represented by Marcus G. Theodore. 
T:JO Siate defendants were represented by Dallin W. Jensen 
arc .Michael M. Quealy. The defendant Irrigation Companies and 
their Presidents and defendant Millard County were represented 
by Robert H. Henderson of the law firm Snow, Christensen & Martinea\ 
The Court having heard and considered the arguments of 
counsel, and having reviewed the supporting affidavits and 
memoranda on file, and the Court being fully advised in the 
premises: 
As to the Motions to Dismiss, the Court concludes that 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3 as amended in 1984 provides absolute 
immunity to governmental entities from suit for any injury or 
damage resulting from management of flood waters and the 
construction, repair, and operation of flood and storm systems 
by governmental entities; the Court concludes that the 1984 
amendment to Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3 is applicable to causes 
of action arising even before the amendment; the Court concludes 
that Utah Code Ann. S 63-30-10 provides immunity from suit for 
discretionary acts relating to river operation, issuance of 
permits, and inspection of dams and other facilities; the Court 
concludes that the acts sued upon were governmental functions 
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for which immunity has not been waived and therefore the 
governmental entities are immune from suit herein pursuant 
to the previsions ci Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3 and § 63-30-10; 
and the Court further concludes that the Complaint in its 
present form fails to give reasonable notice to each defendant 
and fails to plviad a factual basis for tne ccnclusory aiiegatic 
of negligence. 
As to Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint, the Court 
concludes that the Motion is untimely and that the plaintiff 
has failed to offer any explanation for the untimeliness of 
the Motion; the Court further concludes that the Proposed 
Amendment would be futile in that, inter alia, it proposes to 
name as a defendant the insurer of the Irrigation Companies, 
its proposes to name Intermountain Power Service Corporation, a 
entity that, on the undisputed facts, had no ownership interest 
whatsoever in the Irrigation Companies, used no water from the 
Sevier River, and at no time participated in the activities of 
which plaintiff complains, it proposes to name plaintiff's own 
insurer, it would still fail to give reasonable notice to 
each defendant and still fails to plead a factual basis for 
the conclusory allegations of negligence, and in that it still 
would not, and could not, state a civil rights claim under 
42 U.S.C. S 1983 because, as a matter of law, the one time 
flood that occurred does not constitute a "taking". 
Now, therefore, IT IS ORDERED: 
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1. That the plaintiff's Kotion for Leave to Amend 
be, and hereby is denied; 
2. That the Motions to Dismiss of the governmental 
entity defendants, i.e., tne State of Utah, Dee C. Hansen, as 
Utah State Engineer, Roger Walker, as Lower Sevier Commissioner, 
and Millard County be, and hereby are granted? 
3. That the Motions to Dismiss of the Defendant 
Presidents of the Irrigation Companies in their individual 
capacities be, anJ nereby are granted, with leave to the 
plaintiff to amend not later than 10 days from the date hereof 
to allege with specificity acts of the Presidents taken in other 
than their capacity as Presidents of the Irrigation Companies, 
if any there be; 
4. That the Complaint be, and hereby is dismissed 
with leave to the plaintiff to amend not later than 10 days 
from the date hereof to set forth with specificity as to each 
remaining defendant, other than the governmental entity 
defendants, the factual basis for the plaintiff's claims. 
Based thereon, now therefore, it is ORDERED, ADJUDGED 
AND DECREED that: 
Judgment be, and hereby is entered against plaintiff, 
dismissing with prejudice plaintiff's Complaint against 
defendants State of Utah, Dee C. Hansen, as Utah State Engineer, 
Roger Walker, as Lower Sevier River Commissioner, and Millard 
County. 
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The Court hereby expressly determines that there is 
no just reason for delay and hereby expressly directs that 
this Judgment and the Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion for 
Leave to Amend be entered as a finai judgment within the 
neaning of Rule 54(b) of the Utah Pules of Civil Procedure. 
^—gay of , 1984 
BY JP«E>COUI^: 
. Robert Bullock 
.strict Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM 
prior to the signature and 
entry by the Court: 
HT HENDERSON 
Attorney for Irrigation Companies 
their Presidents, and Millard 
County 
Date: 2 7 S&TlH&^ 
MARCUS G. THEODORE 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Date: 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Utah Attorney Gener 
' ' MICHAEL ] 
Assistant Attorne>/Ge/eral 
Attorney for Utah State 
Defendants 
Date : J^V7 /rrf 
-D-
ROBERT H. HENDERSON-
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Irrigation Companies, Their 
Presidents and Millard County 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
P. O. Box 3000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
LULLARB COUNT' 
i if . !>i 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CLAYTON L. PALMER, and his wife 
MARGARET D. PALMER, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
STATE FARM INSURANCE COMPANY; 
JOHN DOE INSURANCE COMPANY; 
STATE OF UTAH; DEE C. HANSEN as 
Utah State Engineer; 
INTERMOUNTAIN POWER SERVICE 
CORPORATION, a Utah corporation; 
DELTA CANAL COMPANY; PHIL SMITH, 
President of Delta Canal Company; 
MELVILLE IRRIGATION COMPANY; 
QUINN SHEPHARD, President of 
Melville Irrigation Company; 
ABRAHAM IRRIGATION COMPANY; 
RICHARD HENRIE, President of 
Abraham Irrigation Company; 
DESERET IRRIGATION COMPANY; 
ROGER STANWORTH, President of 
Deseret Irrigation Company, 
ROGER WALKER as Lower Sevier 
River Commissioner; MILLARD 
COUNTY? DELTA CANAL COMPANY, 
MELVILLE IRRIGATION COMPANY, 
ABRAHAM IRRIGATION COMPANY, and 
DESERET IRRIGATION COMPANY d/b/a 
DMAD COMPANY; DESERET IRRIGATION 
COMPANY and ABRAHAM IRRIGATION 
COMPANY, d/b/a GUNNISON BEND DAM; 
IRISH ANDERSON, TONY ANDERSON, 
VINCENT CROPPER, GARY DUTSON, 
LYLE STANWORTH, THOMAS ARLO S. 
SKEEMS, the AXEL JENSEN ESTATE, 
and JOHN DOE, Conk Water Users, 
Defendants. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 7732 
On August 15, 1984, the following Motions came on 
regularly for hearing before the Honorable David Sam: 
1. Plaintiffs' Motion for Change of Venue. 
2. Defendants Phil C. Nielson's and Central Utah Water 
Company's Motion to Quash. 
3. The Motions to Dismiss of the governmental entity 
defendants. 
4. The Motions to Dismiss of the defendant Irrigation 
Companies and their presidents. 
5. Defendant Intermountain Power Service Corporation's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. 
The plaintiffs were represented by Marcus G. Theodore. 
The State defendants were represented by Dallin K. Jensen 
and Michael M. Quealy. The defendant Irrigation Companies and 
their presidents and defendant Millard County were represented 
by Robert H. Henderson of the law firm Snow, Christensen & 
Martineau. Defendant Intermountain Power Service Corporation 
was represented by Joseph Novak, of counsel, Snow, Christensen 
£ Martineau. 
The Court having heard and considered the arguments of 
counsel, and having reviewed the supporting affidavits and 
memoranda on file, and the Court being fully advised in the 
premises: 
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The Court concludes that Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3 as 
amended in 1984 provides absolute immunity to governmental 
entities from suit for any injury or damage resulting from 
management of flood waters and the construction, repair, and 
operation of flood and storm systems by governmental entities; 
the Court concludes that the 1984 amendment to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-30-3 is applicable to causes of action arising even 
before the amendment; the Court concludes that Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-30-10 provides immunity from suit for discretionary acts 
relating to river operation, issuance of permits, and inspection 
of dams and other facilities; the Court concludes that the acts 
sued upon were governmental functions for which immunity has 
not been waived and therefore the governmental entities are 
immune from suit herein pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-30-3 and S 63-30-10; the Court finds that on the 
undisputed Affidavits on file there is no genuine issue of 
fact and concludes that defendant Intermountain Power Service 
Corporation is entitled to judgment of dismissal as a matter 
of law; and the Court further concludes that the Amended 
Complaint in its present form fails to give reasonable notice 
to each defendant and fails to plead a factual basis for the 
conclusory allegations of negligence. Now therefore, 
IT IS ORDERED: 
1. That the plaintiffs1 Motion for Change of Venue be, 
and hereby is denied with leave to renew the Motion at the time 
of impaneling the jury; 
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2. That the Motion to Quash of the defendants Phil 
Nielson and the Central Utah Water Company be, and hereby is 
granted; 
3. That the Motions to Dismiss of the governmental 
entity defendants, i.e., the State of Utah, Dee C. Hansen, as 
Utah State Engineer, Roger Walker, as Lower Sevier Commissioner, 
and Millard County be, and hereby are converted into Motions for 
Summary Judgment, and that said Motions for Summary Judgment be, 
and hereby are granted; 
4. That the Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendant 
Intermountain Power Service Corporation be, and hereby is granted; 
5. That the Motions to Dismiss of the defendant Presidents 
of the Irrigation Companies in their individual capacities be, 
and hereby are granted, with leave to the plaintiffs to amend 
not later than 10 days from the date hereof to allege with 
specificity acts of the Presidents taken in other than their 
capacity as Presidents of the Irrigation Companies, if any there 
be; 
6. That the Amended Complaint be, and hereby is dismissed 
with leave to the plaintiffs to amend not later than 10 days from 
the date hereof to set forth with specificity as to each 
remaining defendant, other than the governmental entity defendants 
and defendant Intermountain Power Service Corporation, the factual 
basis for the plaintiffs1 claims. 
Based thereon, now therefore, it is ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND 
DECREED that: 
Judgment be, and hereby is entered against plaintiffs, 
dismissing vrith prejudice plaintiffs' Amended Complaint against 
defendants State of Utah, Dee C. Hansen, as Utah State Engineer, 
Rocer Walker, as lower Sevier River Conunissicner, and Millard 
County; and that 
Judgment be, and hereby is entered against plaintiffs, 
dismissing with prejudice plaintiffs' Amended Complaint against 
defendant Intermountain Power Service Corporation• 
DATED this fr+J day of August, 1984. 
BY THE COURT: 
DAVID SAM 
District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM 
prior to the signature and 
entry_fc>y the Court: 
Date 
BERT'H. HENDERSON 
Attorney for Irrigation Companies, 
r president^ and Millard County 
: 26 Ay,<1 I72<1 
*L 
0~SEP!TH%VAK 
ttorney for Intermountain Power 
Service Corporation 
Date; /4es&</sr 20, /9Jf 
Date: 
MARCUS G. THEODORE 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Utah Attorney General 
By. Date 
MICHAEL M. _ 
Assistant Attorney ^ Tneral 
Attorney for Utah State Defendants 
; &*,JQ> /9fr 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
FRANCIS B. CHESLEY, et al, 
Plaintiffs, Civil No. 7^ 86 
vs. RULING 
DELTA CITY, 
Defendant. 
This matter comes before the Court under Rule 2.8 on 
Defendant's motion for summary judgment. The Court 
has received the affidavits on file and the respective 
memorandum of counsel and upon being advised in the premises, 
now makes the following 
RULING 
1. Defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted. 
The Court is of the opinion that plaintiffs' claim is 
barred by Section 63-30-3 UCA, 1953 as amended. The court 
is further of the opinion that Senate Bill 97 adopted by the 
198M Utah Legislature is an affirmation of the prior 
legislative intent as regards flood waters. The Court 
believes that Frank vs. State, 613 P2d 517 is supportive 
of this ruling. 
2. The trial date of July 18, 1984, and the alternative 
(Ruling) (2) 
trial date of November 28, 1984, are hereby vacated, 
--00O00--
Dated this //-day of June, 1984. 
BY THE COURT 
cc: Eldon-A. Eliason 
Attorney at Law 
Robert H. Henderson 
Attorney at Law 
CULLEN$7cHRISTENSEN, JUDGE 
ROBERT H. HENDERSON 
SNOW, CHR1STESSEN & MARTIKEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
P. O. Box 3000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
A, f \.>>>H, .:• . i..-.•<K Of 
DlbTAlC T COUR: 
JUL 11 1984 
MILLARD COUN 
M 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
FRANCIS B. CKESLEY and j 
NONA B. CHESLEY, a 
Plaintiffs, : 
v. : 
DELTA CITY, a Municipal : 
corporation of the State 
of Utah, i 
Defendant. ; 
: ORDER GRANTING 
: SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
i Civil No. 7486 
The Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment came on 
regularly before the Court pursuant to Rule 2.8 of the 
Rules of Practice in the District Courts of the State of Utah. 
The Court having reviewed the affidavits on file, the memoranda 
of counsel, and being fully advised in the premises, and the 
Court being of the opinion that Senate Bill 97 adopted by the 
1984 Utah Legislature is an affirmation of the prior legislativ 
intent with regard to flood waters, and that the plaintiffs' 
claim is barred by Utah Code Ann. S 63-30-3 as amended, now, 
therefore, it is ORDERED: 
That defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment be, and 
hereby is, granted. 
DATED this day of W 1984. 
BY THE COURT: 
^Cullen Y./Christensen 
District/Court Judge 
•2 
r iDiNr.ira'.L'V .** 
ROBERT H. HENDERSON 
SNO.%, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Sandy City 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
P. 0. Box 3000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Telephone: (8C1) 521-9000 
IN' THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ALLAN L. BRAKENSIEK and 
MARILYN BRAKENSIEK, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
DIXIE SIX CORPORATION, SALT 
LAKE COUNTY and SANDY CITY, 
Defendants. 
The Motions to Dismiss of the defendants Dixie Six 
Corporation, Salt Lake County, and Sandy City came before the 
Court on the regular law and motion calendar on May 11, 1984, 
the Honorable Scott Daniels presiding, at 2:00 p.m. The 
plaintiffs were represented by David Scofield of the law firm 
of Parsons and Crowther. Dixie Six Corporation was represented 
by Craig G. Adamson. Salt Lake County was represented by Roger 
A. Livingston. Sandy City was represented by Robert H. Henderson 
of the law firm Snow, Christensen i Martineau. The Court having 
heard the argument of counsel, and having reviewed the memoranda 
on file, and the Court being fully advised in the premises, and 
MAY 16 i:-E', 
/ 
DeK.', Cerr, 
ORDER 
Civil No. C84-0564 
Judge Scott Dar.iels 
the Court being of the opinion that Utah Code Annotated § 63-3^ 
as amended in 1984 provides absolute immunity to governmental 
entities from suit for any injury or danage result from management 
of flood waters and the construction, repair, and operation cf 
flood and storm systems by governmental entities, and the Court 
being of the further opinion that the 1984 amendment to Utah 
Code Annotated § 63-30-3 is applicable to causes of action arising 
even before the amendment, now, therefore, it is ORDERED: 
1. That the Motion to Dismiss of the defendant Salt Lake 
County be, and hereby is, granted; 
2. That the Motion to Dismiss of the defendant Sandy City 
be, and hereby is, granted; 
3. That the Motion to Dismiss of Dixie Six Corporation 
be, and hereby is, denied. 
DATED this { Y day of May, 1984. 
ATTEST 
/ ) C m k f 
A * '•*• i Ty, r i ^ 
BY THE COURT: 
N?-A )&<JU (/'»•' 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Rbrforj^ Liva^ hgston 
Attorney for Salt Lake County 
3r 
CUfW, 
David Scofield 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
" Scott Daniels 
District Court Judge 
/ ' / 
' '' ' ' 
,n
 Craig Adamson 
Attorney for Defendant Dixie 
Six Corporation 
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APPENDIX V 
STANLEY L. BALLIF 
Attorney at Law 
Bank of Utah Building 
2605 Washington BouLevard 
Suite 310 
Ogden, UT 84403 
Telephone: (801) 394-5579 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF AND FOR 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CAROL GREENWOOD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PLEASANT VIEW CITY, a 
Municipal Corporation, 
Defendant. 
O R D E R 
Civil No. 93915 
Judge David Roth 
V^ 
? % 
\1 
The Defendant's Motion to Dismiss was heard by the above entitled 
Court on April 27, 1987. Plaintiff was represented by Stanley L. Ballif 
and Defendant was represented by Christopher C. Fuller. The Defendant had 
submitted a Memorandum of Authorities in support of their Motion and had 
also filed Reply Memorandum to Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition. The 
Court heard arguments from both parties and good cause appearing therefor, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that Defendant's Motion 
to Dismiss is denied in that the statutes relied on by Defendant's only 
provide immunity to the governmental entity in managing, constructing, re-
pairing, operating a storm system, while managing flood waters. 
DATED this 3^4 day of AJOadt-, , 1987. 
CCj* 
BY THE COURT 
3 
Approved as to form 
>/ Q ^ (^Jth 
APPENDIX VI 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
STATE OF UTAH, 
CAROL GREENWOOD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PLEASANT VIEW CITY, 
A Municipal Corporation, 
Defendant 
THE 
"IN 
SECOND 
AND FOR 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
WEBER COUNTY 
JUDGE »S 
Case No. 
RULING 
93915 
OF THE 
on 
abo 
A
 P 
BE IT REMEMBERED that the 
for hearing before the Hon. 
ve entitled Court, on April 
above enti tied 
DAVID E. ROTH, 
27, 1987. 
WHEREUPON, the following proceedings 
p e a r a n c e s : 
STANLEY L. BALLIF, ESQ., 
Attorney for the Plaintiff; 
CHRISTOPHER C. FULLER, ESQ., 
Attorney for the Defendant. 
matter came 
Judge 
were had, 
of 
to 
the 
wit* 
1 
THE COURT: Prior to this hearing, I hadn't seen 
any photographs, and wasn't as clear in the facts as I am 
now, assuming I am now, and I was hoping that what I would 
see would be something in the nature of a manhole cover on 
the street or on a sidewalk. And I think that would take 
it out of the immunity area and put it in the area of 
maintaining streets or sidewalks in a safe condition. 
The other thing that troubles me about this is that I 
understand the reason for the statute. I understand the 
need for the immunity. I understand the need for governmental 
agencies to be able to manage flood waters and be immune 
from their actions. And this isn't the typical kind of 
case I think the Legislature had in mind when they enacted 
this statute. 
I am concerned about the broadness of it, and I am 
going to limit it at this point and deny the Motion to Dismis 
the case. This decision, I think will be ripe for appeal; 
probably should be appealed, because I am not aware of any 
law in this area, and I guess I am making law by making the 
decision. 
Where the statute says the management of flood water 
and other natural disasters, and operations and construction 
of storm systems by governmental entities are considered to 
be governmental functions and so forth, the government and 
their employees will be immune, I am interpreting to mean 
2 
the government is managing, constructing, repairing, operating 
a storm system, while managing flood waters they are immune. 
But it does not mean that once having managed, constructed, 
repaired or operated, they may walk avzay from whatever they 
have done and not maintain it in a safe condition. They 
are not immune. And the word maintenance is left out. I 
think it should be in there. And I don't think that the 
immunity should be as broad as you can logically argue it 
is in this case. 
There you go. Mr. Ballif, you prepare the ruling? 
MR. BALLIF: Yes, I will. Thank you, your Honor. 
MR. FULLER: Thank you, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Good luck. 
3 
C E R T I F I C A T E 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
County of Weber ) 
I, James N. Jones, do hereby certify that I am one of 
the Official Court Reporters for the State of Utah, and 
a competent machine shorthand writer; 
That on April 27, 1987, I reported in machine shorthand 
the proceedings had in the matter of Carol Greenwood vs. 
Pleasant View City, Case No. 93915. 
That thereafter, I reduced a portion of my machine 
shorthand notes to typewriting, and the foregoing transcript 
pages 2 and 3, constitute a full, true and correct transcrip-j: 
of the ruling by Judge Roth. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this 
28th day of July, 1987. 
Totxe 
'Official Court Reporter 
tfames N. J" # s 
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APPENDIX VII 
CHAPTER 92 CHAPTER 93 
H. B, iNo. 171 
Passed February 27, 1985 
Effective April 29, 1985 
JUROR COMPETENCY IN CASES 
INVOLVING ORDINANCES 
By Don R. Strong 
AN ACT RELATING TO JUDICIAL PROCE-
DURE; PROVIDING COMPETENCY 
REQUIREMENTS FOR JURORS SERVING ON 
CASES INVOLVING THE ALLEGED VIOLA-
TION OF MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES. 
THIS ACT AFFECTS SECTIONS OF UTAH 
CODE ANNOTATED 1953 AS FOLLOWS: 
AMENDS: 
78-46-7. AS ENACTED BY CHAPTER 130, 
LAWS OF UTAH 1979 
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah: 
Section 1. Section Amended. 
Section 78-46-7, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
enacted by Chapter 130, Laws of Utah 1979, is 
amended to read: 
78-46-7. Persons competent to serve as jurors. 
(1) A person is competent to serve as a juror 
[provided] if the person is: 
KH] M a citizen of the United States; 
({*)] (b] over the age of 18 years; 
[£*)] (£l a resident of the county: and 
[f4)] (d) able to read, speak, and understand 
the English language. 
(2) In municipalities which are not primary or 
secondary locations for the circuit court, a person is 
not competent to serve as a furor m cases involving 
the violation ot a municipal ordinance unless the 
person, m addition to meeting the requirements 
listed in Subsection (1), resides wuhm the munici-
pality whose ordinance is alleged to have been vio-
lated or. in the case of a municipality with a popu-
lation of fewer than 3,000 persons, resides wuhm 15 
miles of the municipality. 
Approved March 16, 1985 
H. B. No. 177 
Passed February 25, 1985 
Effective April 29, 1985 
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY FOR 
NATURAL DISASTERS 
By Kaye Browning 
AN ACT RELATING TO GOVERNMENTAL 
IMMUNITY; INCLUDING MANAGEMENT OF 
NATURAL DISASTERS AS AN ACTIVITY 
FOR WHICH GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES 
ARE IMMUNE. 
THIS ACT AFFECTS SECTIONS OF UTAH 
CODE ANNOTATED 1953 AS FOLLOWS: 
AMENDS: 
63-30-3, AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER 
33. LAWS OF UTAH 1984 
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah: 
Section 1. Section Amended. 
Section 63-30-3, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
last amended by Chapter 33, Laws of Utah 1984, is 
amended to read: 
63-30-3. Immunity of governmental entities from 
suit. 
Except as may be otherwise provided in this 
chapter, all governmental entities are immune from 
suit for any injury which results from the exercise 
of a governmental function, governmentally-owned 
hospital, nursing home, or other governmental 
health care facility, and from an approved medical, 
nursing, or other professional health care clinical 
training program conducted in either public or pri-
vate facilities. 
The management of flood waters and other natu-
ral disasters and the construction, repair, and oper-
ation of flood and storm systems by governmental 
entities are considered to be governmental func-
tions, and governmental entities and their officers 
and employees are immune from suit for any injury 
or damage resulting from those activities. 
Approved March 16. 1985 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I served the foregoing Appellant's 
Brief by mailing four copies to J« Paul Stockdale, Attorney at 
Law, 2605 Washington Blvd., Suite 340, Ogden, Utah, 84401, who, 
by Entry of Appearance dated December 24, 1987, is attorney of 
record for plaintiff-respondent, this day of February, 1988, 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
r 
Christopher ^.JPuller 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant 
